T HIS study reports on a block of experimental market sessions designed primarily to provide (1) the severest test yet attempted of the equilibrating forces operating in competitive auction markets and (2) a more rigorously controlled test of the \Valrasian hypothesis. 2 Some data are also supplied which show the effect of cash payoffs on the equilibrating behavior of such markets; in particular, the effect of full cash payoffs to all successful trading subjects as against payoffs to a subset of such subjects chosen at random.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIG~ AND SUBJECTS
The supply and demand conditions underlying the experimental design in this study were intentionally unconventional. In each experimental session, each of eleven subject buyers could purchase at most one unit of the fictitious commodity per trading period at a price not to exceed the limit price $4.20. Therefore, the demand per unit of time, or trading period, was perfectly elastic at $4.20 up to the maximum demand quantity of eleven units. In each session each subject seller could sell at most one unit of the commodity at any price not below the given minimum reservation price $3.10. There \Vere thirteen such sellers in two experimental sessions, sixteen in two additional experimental sessions, and nineteen in the 1 The research reported in this paper \Vas supported hy National Science Foundation grants G-24199 and GS-370 to Purdue University. 2 An earlier paper (V. L. Smith, "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," Jmtrnal of Politiwl Economy, LXX [April, 1962], 126--34) seemed to provide sufficient evidence to warrant the tentative conclusion that a linear ver,;ion of the well-known Walrasian hypthesis of competitive market-adjustment behavior \Vas inferior to a linear test allernative called the "excess-rent hypothesis." final two markets. Therefore, the supply per trading period was perfectly elastic up to the maximum supply quantities of thirteen, sixteen, and nineteen units, respectively, in the three experimental treatments.
Each session was begun with a general statement that the group was being asked to participate in a decision-making experiment; that they would not be subjected to any unpleasant stimuli or experiences; and, furthermore, that they would have an opportunity to earn real money during their participation. Copies of instructions were passed out and read aloud to the entire group. 3 The payoff formula for each buyer in each trading period was $0.05 for making a contract plus the difference between his limit buy price and his contract price. Each seller received $0.05 for making a contract plus the difference between his contract price and his limit sell price.
Each subject trader had initial information only on his own limit price. 4 The additional information provided in the course of the market sessions consisted of the ordered public bids and oHers announced by the individual traders. Since the public acceptance of a bid or offer constituted a contract, each trader knew which bids and offers were 3 The printed instructions given to each subject were reproduced in the Appendix to V. L. Smith, "Eilect of Market Organization on Competitive Equilibrium," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXVII (May, 1964) , paragraphs 1-4, SSli, 6SB, The same subjects held the same limit price cards in all trading periods, and this fact -.,.vas evident to all the subjects. They did not know that all buyers had the same limit prices, and all sellers had the ~arne limit prices. They were not told the number of buyers or the number of sellers, but they soon became a"'arc, in successive trading periods, that there was excess supply at the end of each trading period. 387 accepted and which were not. Under these inf01mation conditions it is difficult to imagine a test of the equilibrium tendencies in auction 111:1rkcts that would be more severe than the design described above. In equilibrium, with these supply and demand conditions, the entire rent in this market, ($4.20 $3.10) 
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down to tbc $.1.10 cquilbrium. Thus, suppose earh subject is assumed to have a utility funcLi•m for adrlitional income which is concave from below, and th11t an individual's bargaining resistance is proportional to marginnl utility. Then the nearer is price to the $3.10 equilibrium) the greater is seller resistance to a further rcrluction in price and the ;ve<Jker i.:> buyer resistance to an increase i:J. price. The question is w-hether the competition created by excess sellers will produce equilibrium even under this condition of exaggerated imbalance in the rental rewards to hargaining.
The 162 subjects participating in these experiments .,.vcre Sophomore aud Junior students enrolled in three sections errch of two undergraduate coursrs in economics. One cotJrse w:Ls in.troductory economics, the other introductory economic tht-~OI')'. Two replications were run under each of the three valuefi, 2, 5, and 8 for the "treatment"
variable, e ~·:: excess supply. "'
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3.20 price-cutting is independent of such potential trading losses, dependir._g only on the constant excess supply on the market.
1Iathematically, VVH implies an adjustment equation of the following form:
while ERH implies
where prJ = 310 is the theoretical equilibrium in cents, {3 is the adjustment speed coefficient under \VH, a is the adjustment creasing function of e as shown. It is seen that our peculiar experimental supply and demand design provides a relatively crucial test of WH as opposed to ERH.
Using this analysis and the data froe1 the six experiments reported in the last section the test of WH against ERH is based upon the stochastic process defined by
which is a general linear hypothesis containing both \VH and ERR as special polar cases. Table 2 shows the results of least-squares regression estimates of the coefficients of equations (1) 1' c win-~ --.Nii;·<-(i~-;;; 6T-P( --~-<al<Oji31=0)P(,d1=0)
.P(!l,-< .. 6~-~ 0 ) !'(;;;-,;_: ())~ > 300
Th~~ odds favoring ERH arc o-;;er 300 to 1. Supply, R servation~ ---------------------------------------- -0.087, t(5) = 0.40. An F-test comparison of the estimates G-2 under weak and full cash payoffs shows the difierences to be highly significant (a< 0.005) fore= 2, but insignificant for e = 5. \Ve conclude that there exist some conditions under which experimental results are likely to be biased to an important degree by the substitution of random for full cash payoffs. Consequently, the use of random payoffs cc.nnot genera1ly be defended as a compromise between no payoffs and full cash payoffs.
SUMJI.1:ARY
The results of our six experimental ~es sions tend to support the vie\"'' that the auction-market mechanism prcx1uces strong competitive equilibrating tendencies, even under conditions of extreme imbalance in 13.8 (0.0676) fact that the experimental design wos determined by the objective of providing good discrimination between the competing hypotheses.
The experimental sessions under full cash payoffs to all subjects were compared with two pilot sessions under full cash payoffs to only a subset of subjects chosen at random. The results show enough difference in market behavior to suggest that one should not arbitrarily substitute random payofl rewards for full payoff rewards, on the assumption that the results will not be significantly altered.
